Active Shooter – Disgruntled Employee Scenario Discussion-Based Exercise Development Kit #1

Maritime Incident Preparedness and Response Discussion-Based Exercise Project

June 2017
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PROJECT OVERVIEW

The Maritime Security Center (MSC), a DHS Center of Excellence in Maritime and Port Security led by the Stevens Institute of Technology in conjunction with the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute (SDMI) at Louisiana State University has been working to develop scenarios and tabletop exercise resources to enhance the core capabilities and preparedness of port facilities and port operators to an array of hazards, including natural and man-made threats. It is the MSC’s intent to extend these resources to the broad spectrum of port partners that comprise the maritime community, including public and private, local, state and Federal organizations. The MSC/SDMI tabletop exercise program builds upon other nationally recognized Executive Education Programs to provide support and resource materials for maritime and port stakeholders to develop and exercise their own tabletop and discussion-based activities.

Prior to the participation and development of any exercise content, staff from MSC and SDMI met with key stakeholders, to include the U.S. Coast Guard, Sector New York and Sector New Orleans, to discuss a range of scenarios that were critical to the Ports. Through these dialogues, the two areas of concern that were most commonly identified involved active shooter, with emphasis placed on an event taking place at a cruise terminal, and cyber based intrusions for nefarious purposes. Based on the requirement to develop exercises for these two emerging threats, the initial focus of this initiative has been geared towards developing content that will assist exercise design teams in developing realistic scenarios for active shooter and cybersecurity disruptions. As part of the process of developing content, scenarios and exercises design resources, the SDMI team worked directly with the Port of New Orleans, Port of New York/New Jersey, and the Area Maritime Security Committee for the Gulf of Mexico to develop an active shooter exercise and multiple cyber based exercises. Content from these exercises, as well as additional content, has been developed by an SDMI working group consisting of emergency managers, cyber experts, port officials and Master Exercise Practitioners to provide a series of exercise scenarios to be used by ports and their tenants to test core capabilities related to active shooter and cyber threats.

The final year of this project has focused on integrating the lessons learned from the development and design of five separate exercises into the design and deployment of an “Exercise-in-a-Box” development kit to be leveraged by port affiliated exercise design teams. The purpose of the exercise development kits is to assist and enable other ports and USCG Sectors to customize and conduct their own discussion-based exercises focused on responding to active shooter and cyber based threats. The complete series of exercise scenarios can be found on the MSC website at:

Overview of the Exercise Design Kit

The active shooter discussion based exercise development kit is designed to provide a series of four active shooter scenarios that will allow members of the maritime community to develop an exercise scenario based on their current capabilities to respond to an active shooter event. Each of the scenarios build upon the first scenario and introduce a greater element of complexity to an active shooter response. The intent is to allow ports to take a crawl, walk, run approach in their efforts to build an enhanced capability in responding to an active shooter event.

All four exercise scenarios are built around four modules. The first module is the “Threat Awareness” module, and is designed to facilitate discussion around existing security postures and how participants would respond if there was a specific threat indicator that would raise awareness of a potential active shooter event. The second module is the “Pre-Incident / Incident” module, in which the players are introduced to either a precursor of a pending active shooter event or the initiating element of an active shooter event. The purpose of the “Pre-Incident / Incident” module is to initiate discussion on what protocols exist when an active shooter indicator is present and the initial response once an active shooter event is initiated. Module three is the “Escalation” module, in which the active shooter event reaches its apex, and is designed to illicit discussion on a comprehensive response to an active shooter event. The final module is the “Post-Event” module, which is meant to allow the participants to discuss how an active shooter event within or near their facility may change their security posture and screening efforts moving forward.

With the intent to provide the exercise design team with a full range of active shooter based scenarios, this exercise design series consists of four different aspects of an active shooter scenario. The four modules are based on the following potential scenarios: 1) An active shooter that involves a disgruntled employee; 2) an active shooter that involves a domestic dispute in or near a cruise terminal; 3) a lone wolf terrorist attack at an active cruise terminal; and finally a complex coordinated terrorist attack at a cruise terminal. The first module is intentionally designed to allow the exercise design team to take place within any facility located in a Port. The remaining three modules are specifically designed to test a response at a soft target at the port that allows unfettered access to or near the intended target. These modules are meant to be used individually based on the current capabilities of a port system, or to be conducted as two or more exercises that allow a port system to establish a foundation on their overall response capabilities with the ability to add more complexity and challenges to a significantly more difficult scenario.

This development kit is meant to serve as a resource to help the exercise support team design most aspects of an actual discussion based exercise. This kit was designed based on guidelines established by the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). In addition, the development kit includes scenarios that will provide an opportunity for the Captain of the Port to raise the MARSEC level for the port, a specific industry within the port or a specific operation.
within the port to ensure facilities can meet their annual reporting requirements to exercise their Facility Security Plan.

Resources of the Exercise Design Kit

Each exercise development kit includes the following resources:

1) **List of Potential Players and Observers** – Based on experiences with the exercises that were developed as part of this project, a matrix is provided that identifies potential participants and observers for each of the scenarios. This is not a complete list and should not be used to preclude an important player within a port. This list serves as a guide on potential agencies that would have an important capability / responsibility in an active shooter event. Also, based on location, some of the listed participants may not have a capability within a specific port that would be able to influence an actual response. Participants are listed by agency and not individual components within a specific agency. It’s important for the exercise design team to recognize some recommended agencies may have more than one entity that should be at the table. For example, local law enforcement should include the specific law enforcement district that has jurisdictional authority; however, if the law enforcement element has a Special Reaction Team, someone from the team should also be included.

2) **Core Capability Alignment** – DHS/FEMA has published a list of 32 core capabilities. While all core capabilities may not be completely relevant to an active shooter, there are quite a few that are applicable. As part of the development kit, we are providing a list of core capabilities that are aligned to an active shooter event within the port system. In addition, some of the identified core capabilities may only align to a more complex active shooter event and may not be relevant to a single shooter. Each of the scenarios has specific core capabilities that are more closely aligned with that scenario.

3) **Recommended Objectives** – For each of the relevant core capabilities, we have also identified potential / sample objectives that can be leveraged for the actual exercise. These objectives are intentionally written in a way that is generic and not specific to any particular participant or process being evaluated in an exercise. If the exercise design team identifies objectives that are relevant to their exercise, they can use as is or add more clarity and specificity to each of the relevant objectives.

4) **Scenario Builder** – The scenario builder provides four injects for each of the four modules. The multiple injects allow the exercise design team to take different routes for an active shooter event while increasing the overall level of complexity, or simplifying the event if the exercise participants have minimal capacity to effectively respond to an active shooter scenario. The injects can be used as they are currently written, or the exercise design...
team can add more specific information to the inject, such as a specific location / building in which the injects would actually occur. Modifying the injects to fit a specific facility will add to the realism of the exercise.

5) **Facilitator Guide** – The facilitator guide identifies questions that a facilitator can use during the actual exercise. While the list of questions is not a complete list of all potential questions, it represents a significant starting point that can be leveraged to help in the process of completing the desired questions that will ultimately be used during the execution of the exercise.
LIST OF POTENTIAL PLAYERS AND OBSERVERS

This section contains a list of recommended participants and observers that should be considered in developing an invite list for the actual exercise. Ultimately, it is up to the Exercise Support Team to determine who should actually be a participant/observer. Some of these agencies should also be considered when developing the Exercise Support Team. When warranted, clarification for each of the listed agencies is provided. Included with the recommended participants is a complete list of recommended roles for all four active shooter modules.

Participants:

Port Administration: Included among the Port Administration should be some representing the C-Suite to include Operations, as well as the Port Facility Security Officer.

Port Police

Port Facilities: Facilities meeting the requirement to have an FSO should be considered. Due to the significant nature of the type event, other tenants should also be included.

U.S. Coast Guard Sector: Participants should consider including the Captain of the Port (or designee), Port Security Specialist, and a uniformed member from Contingency Planning and Response.

Local Homeland Security / Emergency Preparedness Office

Local Police Department: Participants should consider inviting the district with jurisdictional authority, a headquarters element, and a representative from a Special Reaction Team.

Local EMS

Local Fire Representative

State Police / State Patrol: Consider including representatives from the local troop, headquarters, and Crisis Response / Special Reaction Team.

Observers:

State Homeland Security / Emergency Preparedness Office National Guard
Preparedness Office Cruise Lines

State Fusion Center FBI

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Customs Border and Patrol
Joint Terrorism Task Force: members beyond the FBI.

DHS Protective Services

Potential Players and Observers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Scenario 1: Disgruntled Employee</th>
<th>Scenario 2: Domestic Dispute</th>
<th>Scenario 3: Lone Wolf Attack</th>
<th>Scenario 4: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Administration</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Police</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Facilities</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility FSO</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local EMS</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Fire</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Fusion Center</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Police / State Patrol</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cruise Lines</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs Border and Patrol</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS Protective Services</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
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<td>FEMA Region</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
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<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Marshalls</td>
<td>Player: X</td>
<td>Observer: X</td>
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CORE CAPABILITY ALIGNMENT

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) calls for the identification of core capabilities to be exercised during a discussion based exercise at the beginning of the design process. Ideally, initial guidance should be provided by port officials, Captain of the Port, or facility decision makers on essential components and identified priorities that serve as the focus of the exercise. Once priorities are established, identification of core capabilities to meet the initial guidance is important to develop relevant objectives that are nested with the chosen core capabilities. The following core capabilities have been identified as having the most applicability for an active shooter event that is based on a disgruntled employee. Prior to moving forward with the exercise design, the exercise support team should review the full list of all 32 core capabilities to determine if there are others core capabilities they may want to integrate in the design. To ensure the exercise focuses on specific capabilities, the exercise support team should select three or four of the core capabilities to be assessed in the exercise.

Risk Management
Identify, assess, and prioritize risks to inform Protection activities and investments.

Physical Protective Measures
Reduce or mitigate risks, including actions targeted at threats, and/or consequences, by controlling movement and protecting borders, critical infrastructure, and the homeland.

On-scene Security and Protection
Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas, and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Operational Coordination
Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Operational Communications
Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

Situational Awareness
Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
The following table provides a complete list of all capabilities that are associated with the full complement of active shooter scenarios:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Core Capability Alignment</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disgruntled Employee</strong></td>
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<td>• On Scene Security,</td>
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<td>Protection and Law</td>
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<td>Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Risk Management for</td>
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<td>Protection Programs</td>
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<td>and Program Activities</td>
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<td>• Physical Protection</td>
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<td>Measures</td>
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<td>• Operational</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>• Operational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Situational Awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Incident</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• On Scene Security,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection and Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
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<td>Communications</td>
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<td>• Situational Awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lone Wolf</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intelligence and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
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<td>• On Scene Security,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection and Law</td>
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<td>Enforcement</td>
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<td>• Risk Management for</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>• Situational Awareness</td>
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<td>• Fatality Management</td>
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<td>• Economic Recovery</td>
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<td><strong>Coordinated Attack</strong></td>
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<td>• Intelligence and</td>
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<td>Information Sharing</td>
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<td>• Fatality Management</td>
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<td>• Economic Recovery</td>
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RECOMMENDED OBJECTIVES

The following objectives are meant to serve as a guide for the exercise support team to consider in developing objectives. By no means are the suggested objectives a complete list of potential objectives. The objectives are intentionally written not to be specific to any port or facility. When considering the following objectives, the exercise support team should modify to fit their own needs and, if desired, identify specific facilities or elements within the port system that make the objectives specific to the agencies/facilities participating in the exercise.

1) Risk Management:

Objective 1a: Identify areas of improvement for the emergency management / risk management program.

Objective 1b: Determine if the current Facility Security Plan is sufficient to prepare for and respond to an active shooter event.

Objective 1c: Determine if the facilities current threat assessment is sufficient to respond to an active shooter.

Objective 1d: Determine if the active shooter hazard is properly prioritized within the current risk management framework for the facility.

2) Physical Protection Measures:

Objective 2a: Assess the effectiveness of current protective measures to protect the workforce from an active shooter event.

Objective 2b: Determine the readiness level of security personnel to adequately respond to an active shooter event.

Objective 2c: Examine if the current preparedness level of the workforce is sufficient to provide immediate life-saving actions for the current workforce during an active shooter event.

3) On-scene Security and Protection:

Objective 3a: Identify ways to improve safety and security of port facilities and operations during emergency events.

Objective 3b: Determine if there are any gaps in the current security force to properly secure port facilities during an active shooter event.
Objective 3c: Determine effectiveness of the current security force to integrate with local public safety entities to provide enhanced security for the port facility.

4) **Operational Coordination:**

Objective 4a: Examine the operational coordination requirements between the local first responder agencies in response to an active shooter event on a land based port facility.

Objective 4b: Enhance the ability of the Port / Facility leaders and decision makers to respond to a major emergency or disaster.

Objective 4c: Examine the limits of mutual aid, with the intent to determine the capabilities of the Port to respond to an event absent of substantial and immediate assistance.

Objective 4d: Develop a common understanding of key homeland security policies, emergency management strategies, authorities, plans and organizational structure.

Objective 4e: Identify gaps and needs in the command and control structure of disaster response.

5) **Operational Communications:**

Objective 5a: Determine the ability and effectiveness of integrating disparate radio systems between port, port tenants, and local first responders.

Objective 5b: Determine the ability of first responder agencies to establish a communication plan that utilizes appropriate talk groups on a shared radio system.

Objective 5c: Determine the best way to establish voice communications with affected port facility.

Objective 5d: Establish secondary and tertiary means of communications between affected port facility.

6) **Situational Awareness:**

Objective 6a: Determine the effectiveness of port officials / port facilities to share information and provide situational awareness to local first responders.
Objective 6b: Determine the effectiveness of port officials / local first responders to develop situational awareness of an active shooter event at a port facility.

Objective 6c: Determine the effectiveness of port officials / local first responders to monitor social media to enhance situational awareness of an escalating event at a port facility.

Objective 6d: Determine if notification systems are sufficient to alert the port system of an immediate active shooter threat.
**SCENARIO BUILDER**

The active shooter scenarios are designed around four modules: Module 1 – Threat Awareness; Module 2 – Pre-Incident / Incident; Module 3 – Incident Escalation; Module 4 – Post-Incident. For each module, four injects are provided to allow the exercise support team to develop an exercise that meets the specific goals and objectives that the exercise is being designed to achieve. The exercise support team can pick and choose the injects in any combination that ultimately facilitates the assessment of objectives that are ultimately settled upon for their specific exercise. When deciding on which injects to use, designers are encouraged to change elements of the injects, such as specific location of an event or specific facility in which the event occurs, to add realism.

The overall incident of the disgruntled employee active shooter is based on one or two employee related events occurring at the workplace. The active shooter event is initiated as the result of pending layoffs or an employee dispute that is escalated to the point of violence. These two scenarios were taken from real world events that have occurred over the last several years.

**Module 1 – Threat Awareness**

The first module, Threat Awareness, is designed to explore the current security posture and risk management framework currently employed within a port facility or multiple facilities. The intent of the first inject is to raise awareness that the potential threat of violence exists and discuss the possibilities that a facility’s security posture may be modified because of the threat. Inject 1a is based on a layoff notice delivered to multiple employees. Inject 1b is focused on the escalation of workplace violence resulting from a feud between two employees. The intent of Inject 1a and 1b is to identify a specific threat to an individual facility based on a real world event. Injects 1c and 1d are more general with no specific threat to the facility. Inject 1c is based on widely reported terrorist propaganda on social media threatening to target the United States and actual terrorist attacks in Europe. Inject 1d is the actual release of an Elevated Alert through the National Terrorism Advisory System.

**Module 1 (Threat Awareness) - Core Capability Alignment:**

- Risk Management
- Physical Protective Measures
- On Scene Security and Protection
Module 1 (Threat Awareness) Injects:

**Inject 1a:** Within the last week a major employer within the port notified several employees that due to unexpected setbacks with port operations, the employer would be laying off multiple employees. The port facility notified several of the affected employees that in two weeks their employment would no longer be needed. Several of the employees expressed disbelief and angry sentiments about the company to their supervisors upon being notified.

**Inject 1b:** During a shift change at one of the port facilities, a fight broke out between two employees as they were waiting to exit the facility. Internal security apprehended the two employees before events escalated out of control. Upon interviewing the two employees, the facility learns that the employee disagreement stemmed from one employee accusing the other of endangering other employees by careless operation of facility equipment. The employee who filed a complaint had also previously accused the same employee of violating multiple workplace policies in the past.

**Inject 1c:** CNN is reporting that after recent ISIS claimed successful terrorist attacks in Europe, ISIS has released several online videos and posts throughout social media indicating they have issued instructions to followers in the United States that they should immediately begin conducting attacks that disrupt the daily operations of the American people. While the Department of Homeland Security has no credible evidence of an imminent attack, they have warned public safety officials to be extra vigilant and report anything out of the ordinary to their local law enforcement or State/local fusion centers.

**Inject 1d:** On _________________ the Department of Homeland Security has issued an Elevated Alert through the National Terrorism Advisory System. The Elevated Alert provides a warning to law enforcement officials about potential terrorist activity directed specifically towards the maritime and aviation transportation sector.

**Module 2 – Pre-Incident / Incident**

The second module, Pre-Incident / Incident, provides multiple injects that builds on the injects provided in Module 1. The injects are designed to facilitate an active shooter event in an industrial area, as well as an office environment. The goal of inject 2 is to assess the ability of a facility to provide an initial response to a pending or actual active shooter event. Inject 2a and 2b provide an early warning that a potential workplace violence incident may be imminent, with 2a consisting of a family member reporting irrational behavior of an employee. Inject 2b provides notification that an employee has been observed brandishing a firearm within the facility. Inject 2c and 2d offer a little more complexity by the event initiating with little to no notice. Inject 2c is based on an altercation resulting in one of the participants pulling out a weapon, while inject 2d offers the most complex scenario for a disgruntled employee by locking himself in an office building with multiple employees.
Module 2 (Pre-Incident / Incident) – Core Capability Alignment:

- Operational Coordination
- Operational Communications

Module 2 (Pre-Incident / Incident) Injects:

**Inject 2a:** A supervisor within a port facility has just received a call from a family member of an employee at the facility. The family member indicated that the employee had acted funny and was irate at recent events that took place at the facility prior to leaving for work this morning. The family member stated the employee normally carries a firearm, and further expressed concern that due to the employee’s irrational behavior prior to work, there was concern that he wasn’t thinking clearly.

**Inject 2b:** An employee places a call immediately to on-site security stating that she has just observed an employee carrying a firearm within the facility.

**Inject 2c:** On-site security has been notified that two employees have entered into an altercation following a short-heated exchange between the two employees. Immediately following the altercation, one employee pulled out a weapon and threatened to shoot the other employee.

**Inject 2d:** On-site security has been notified that an employee has entered the administration building and barricaded the entrance into one of the office suites. As the employee was entering the office suite, he pulled out a handgun. Four employees are believed to be in the suite with the gunman.

Module 3 – Event Escalation

The Event Escalation module provides the participants the opportunity to discuss how they would engage in a coordinated response between the facility and local law enforcement. This module is designed to explore the operational coordination and operational communication issues between the facility and responding public safety officials. Each inject offers an additional element of complexity in coordinating the response. **Inject 3a** results in an actual shooting, but only involves the victim, with the shooter remaining in the area in which the shooting takes place. **Inject 3b** escalates the event by having the shooter flee from the immediate vicinity and remaining loose with the facility. **Inject 3c** adds the element of an additional victim, with the victim being a security officer. The intent is to demonstrate that the shooter is showing a willingness to engage additional targets. **Inject 3d** builds upon **inject 3c**, with the shooter engaging in multiple shots behind the barricaded doors of the office suite. **Inject 3d** is designed
to explore the coordination challenges between facility personnel and local / state first responders who would be immediately responding to an incident. In addition to operation and communication coordination being explored, the module also offers an opportunity to determine how information would be shared between multiple agencies.

**Module 3 (Escalation) – Core Capability Alignment:**

- Operational Coordination
- Operational Communications
- Situational Awareness

**Module 3 (Escalation) – Injects:**

**Inject 3a:** Immediately following a verbal altercation between two employees, one of the employees pulls out a weapon and fires three shots into the chest of the other employee. Nearby employees immediately begin to flee the area. The shooter is last observed standing over the shot employee.

**Inject 3b:** Immediately following a verbal altercation between two individuals, one of the individuals pulls out a weapon and fires multiple shots into the victim. The shooter is last observed fleeing the area.

**Inject 3c:** Immediately following a verbal altercation between two employees, one of the employees pulls out a weapon and fires multiple shots into the victim. The shooter is last observed fleeing the area. A nearby security officer who was the first person to respond was shot by the shooter and is currently immobile. The officer was able to report the general vicinity within the facility in which the shooter was heading before losing contact with the shooter.

**Inject 3d:** After barricading himself into a suite of the administration building, multiple shots are heard coming from the suite. Immediately following the initial barrage of shots, additional shots can be heard within the suite. After the second round of shots no other sounds can be observed coming from within the suite.

**Module 4 – Post Incident**

The purpose of Module 4 – Post Incident, is to bring a conclusion to the immediate event and facilitate discussion about the impacts on the overall security posture of a facility post active shooter event. The discussion for Module 4 is designed to refocus on the initial core capabilities
dealing with Risk Management, Physical Protective Measure and On Scene Security. Inject 4a concludes with the shooter surrendering himself to law enforcement. Inject 4b results in the shooter taking his own life. As they are written, Inject 4a and 4b are geared towards the employee with the layoff notice, although they can easily be altered to reflect the employee workplace violence scenario. Inject 4c brings conclusion to the immediate event at the facility, with the active shooter blending in with the fleeing workforce and escaping apprehension. With an active shooter lose in a port, the opportunity of the Captain of the Port to raise the MARSEC level for the Port or parts of the Port exists. This also offers an opportunity to explore coordinating issues involving a man-hunt, although the purposes of this exercise is the overall risk management process involving the actual active shooter event. Finally, Inject 4d brings conclusion to the active shooter event with the office suite scenario.

Module 4 (Post Incident) – Core Capability Alignment:

- Risk Management
- Physical Protective Measures
- On Scene Security and Protection

Module 4 (Post Incident) – Injects:

**Inject 4a:** After being surrounded by law enforcement, the shooter willingly gives himself up and is apprehended by local police. The shooter had just been notified that he was being terminated by the company and saw no other recourse due to surmounting debt and additional financial obligations that would only be magnified with the pending layoff. The shooter voluntarily stated he was acting alone.

**Inject 4b:** Immediately upon being surrounded by law enforcement, the shooter takes his own life. The shooter had been notified the previous day by his employer that he was being laid off from the company.

**Inject 4c:** In the confusion immediately following the initial shooting, the shooter was able to blend in with the fleeing workers and remains at large. The facility has been cleared and one employee is found dead. The identity of the shooter is unknown at this time.

**Inject 4d:** Upon conducting a tactical entry into the administration suite, officers learn that the shooter had taken his own life. Prior to committing suicide, he had taken the life of two administrative personnel and the supervisor which had provided him with a layoff notice the day prior.
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FACILITATOR GUIDE

One of the most important aspects of any discussion based exercise is the development of a comprehensive script for the facilitator. This part of the development kit is designed to provide a framework in which any Exercise Support Team can establish an initial foundation of relevant questions for a facilitator to ask during the actual delivery of the exercise. The questions are organized by module and by core capability. The Facilitator Guide is not a complete list of all relevant questions. These questions are general and meant to apply to any participant of a facility. When designing the final bank of questions, the Exercise Support Team should include questions that are based on actual security policies and procedures, the Facility Security Plan, and other relevant sources that are specific to the Port community. Once the specific core capabilities for an exercise are settled upon, the Exercise Support Team should review some of the questions from the other core capabilities as they may be loosely related to other capabilities not selected for the exercise.

At the conclusion of this section, a full exercise script that was used for the delivery of an active shooter event for the Port of New Orleans is provided as a guide on how to fully develop a facilitator script. One aspect that will be noticed in the New Orleans script is that the scenarios are not included in the script. To add realism to the New Orleans exercise, LSU’s Manship School of Mass Communications was used to develop actual news clips to facilitate the discussion. The news clips very closely follow the final injects that are available in the Complex Coordinated Terrorism Attack Exercise Development Kit.

Questions for Inject 1 – Threat Awareness

Core Capability: Risk Management

1. Does your current risk management plan include workplace violence as a potential hazard?

2. Are employees trained on how to respond to violence in the workplace?

3. What are your current reporting procedures for violence in the workplace?

4. Do you have administrative processes on how to respond to workers involved with workplace violence?

5. Are employees trained on how to respond to an active shooter event?

6. Does your facility have an active shooter plan in place? Are there safe spaces?
7. How often does your facility conduct risk assessments and what is the process for conducting the assessment?

8. How do you prioritize your risk? Where does active shooter fall on this list?

9. Based on recent events, is your threat for active shooter where it needs to be?

10. What resources are made available for employees at this point in time from a training and response perspective? What about post event? For how long are these resources available?

**Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures**

1. Based on the NTAS alert / Recent Events / Social Media publications are you changing your security posture for your facility?

2. Would the Captain of the Port consider changing the MARSEC level based on an alert that indicates the maritime and air transportation sectors may be targeted?

3. If so, what MARSEC level would be considered?

4. Based on notification of employee terminations, are you changing or modifying access control? If so, how? (Both physical and network access)

5. Would you allow the affected employees to keep working?

6. How much time is there between notification and separation?

7. How do you determine which of the employees access is changed?

8. Does your facility have existing policies that deal with employee access after notification of intent to layoff?

9. Does your facility have existing policies that limit access to an employee who has demonstrated a willingness to participate in workplace violence?

**Core Capability: On Scene Security and Protection**

1. What are your current security protective measures?

2. What are normal day to day security levels?

3. At what point is the security level raised? Who makes this decision? Who is the decision shared with internally and externally?
4. Is the Coast Guard notified? If so, when?

5. What are your current on site physical security capabilities? Are your security forces armed? Are they internal or contracted?

6. In the event of an employee termination, what are your policies? Are their policies in place once the employee is terminated to prohibit access?

7. Is any of this information shared with other port partners?

8. Does the facility have a mechanism to share “Be On the Look Out” for potential hostile employees? How is this information disseminated? Is it shared with adjacent facilities? Is it shared with the Port? If notified, would the Port disseminate to other port facilities?

Questions for Inject 2 – Pre-Incident / Incident

Core Capability: On Scene Security and Protection

1. How do the facilities in the Port respond to a potential threat warning from an employee phoned in by a family member of an employee? How is the phone call processed? Who is it routed to?

2. Assuming the employee hasn’t made it into the facility before the call, would any changes be made to the screening process?

3. What would be the procedure if the employee is found trying to enter the facility?

4. Would the facility make any change to its security posture?

5. Would this information be shared with adjacent facilities? Port authorities? Would the USCG be notified? If so, who specifically would be notified? Who would make the notification?

6. Is there any type of dedicated information sharing capability within the Port?

7. Assuming an employee was able to bring a weapon into the facility, what would be the procedure if someone observed an employee walking throughout the facility openly carrying a firearm?
8. Would internal security respond? Management? Would local law enforcement be notified?

9. Would the employee be detained? Questioned? What is the existing protocol in dealing with this type of event?

10. What are the procedures to intervene when there is an employee on employee altercation?

11. What would be the protocol in responding to the altercation if a weapon was drawn by one of the employees?

12. Would this be handled with internal resources, or would external resources be required?

**Core Capability: Operational Coordination**

1. Do protocols currently exist for responding to a potential hostage situation within a facility?

2. Who would be notified? How would they be notified?

3. How long would it take for local law enforcement to realistically reach the scene?

4. In addition to law enforcement, who else would respond?

5. Who has overall authority to manage an active shooter event that is believed to be initiated by a disgruntled employee?

6. What is the USCG’s role in an event like this?

7. Are there existing relationships with local law enforcement and the port facilities?

8. Are local law enforcement familiar with the layout of the facility?

**Core Capability: Operational Communications**

1. Does the facility have the ability to communicate directly with law enforcement on secure voice networks?

2. What types of communication capabilities are available to the facilities?
3. Does the FSO have the ability to communicate directly with law enforcement outside of a cell phone or land line?

4. Can the FSO communicate directly with the Port or USCG?

5. Would information of a potential hostage situation be shared with other facilities? Who would notify the facilities? How would they be notified?

6. How does the Port communicate with law enforcement? The USCG?

7. Is there a shared radio system that the Port and local first responders use? If yes, are there common talk groups?

8. Do policies exist that determine how the radio system is used during an emergency? Are the first responders aware of these policies? Do they know how to properly execute the policies during an emergency?

9. Are there disparate systems between Port and local public safety? Does the capability to bridge disparate radio systems exist? Do the agencies that have the bridging capability have personnel that are properly trained on bridging disparate radio systems?

**Questions for Inject 3 – Incident Escalation**

**Core Capability: Operational Coordination**

1. What are the authorities who can force closures of facilities? To what extent do closures take place?

2. Would this scenario result in the closing of a facility?

3. Would an active shooter event at a port facility have any impact on maritime traffic? Who would make that decision?

4. Would the waterway immediately adjacent to the affected facility be impacted?

5. What considerations would be taken in making the decision to adjust traffic?

6. Would state and federal law enforcement be requested at this point or would it be contained at the local level?
7. Have security personnel at port facilities have sufficient training to respond to an active shooter at the facility?

8. Have local security trained with integrating with local law enforcement?

9. Are the Port Facilities familiar with the Incident Command System?

10. Do they know their role in the ICS system during an active shooter event?

11. Have they actively practiced implanting ICS for any disaster?

12. Would a unified command be established or would this be managed by local/port law enforcement?

13. If the shooter is still loose and active would State assets be requested?

14. With the event escalating, does it have any impact on MARSEC levels? If so, how long would the MARSEC level be raised?

15. What is the USCG doing at this point?

16. What is the role of the USCG for an on shore active shooter event?

17. Who would be handling media requests? Local law enforcement? Affected facility? Elected official? Port?

18. Would a Joint Information Center be established? If so, who would take lead?

**Core Capability: Operational Communications**

1. Who is responsible for establishing a communication plan?

2. Do any of the local first responder agencies / USCG have communication leaders / communication technicians on staff and trained?

3. How are notifications and updates being shared with port tenants? When and who is notifying the port executive authorities?

4. When is local emergency management / homeland security notified?
Core Capability: Situational Awareness

1. How does the facility relay intelligence information to external stakeholders?
2. How is the information being distributed to responding agencies?
3. Who would be responsible for painting the big picture?
4. What resources are available to help do that?
5. Is your PIO or communications representative notified? At what point?

Inject 4 – Post Incident

Core Capability: Risk Management

1. Having gone through an active shooter, how does this impact your existing threat assessment?
2. Does this event change the way you prioritize your risk?
3. Based on this scenario, do you believe your threat for active shooter is where it needs to be?
4. From a recovery perspective, what resources are made available for employees at this point in time? For how long are these resources available? Do you have existing relationships with mental health providers?

Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures

1. What does the impact of the assailant still on the lose have any consideration to adjusting MARSEC levels?
2. How would the adjacent facilities handle a potential active shooter on the port system? How are they being notified?
3. Do you believe your current policies and security postures are sufficient to protect against a potential disgruntled employee becoming an active shooter.

4. What adjustments to you think need to be made to your Facility Security Plan to accommodate for an active shooter? What training do you think you will need for your security personnel, your normal workforce?

**Core Capability: On Scene Security and Protection**

1. Now that you have gone through an active shooter scenario, do you believe your security posture and policies are sufficient to respond to an active shooter event?

2. What adjustments do you think need to be made? Any policies that need to be reviewed?

3. Do your currently security levels allow you to sufficiently ramp if there is an active shooter in your facility?

4. Are your current notification procedures of adjacent facilities, port officials, USCG sufficient to ensure timely notification of an active shooter event in your facility?

5. Are local first responders adequately familiar with your facility?

6. Are there areas that would respond violently if an errand bullet punctured a structure? Are those areas identified? Are they shared with local law enforcement?
Sample Exercise Outline / Script

Port of New Orleans Discussion-Based Exercise
Conducted by the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute at
Louisiana State University and the Maritime Security Center, Stevens Institute of Technology, New Jersey.

“Response to and Recovery from an Active Shooter Event”

Port of New Orleans
June 8, 2016
8:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Discussion Outline and Key Questions

Preface to the Discussion Outline: The Discussion Outline was developed as a tool to facilitate dialogue among the exercise participants and serve as a resource for follow-on exercises and future training opportunities. The list of questions and observations throughout the outline are intended to aid the exercise participants, and to serve as topics for consideration and conversation in exploring additional issues that may arise as the result of an active shooter event.

9:00 a.m.
Welcoming and Opening Remarks
Brant Mitchell, Director SDMI

Program Purpose

The Maritime Security Center a DHS Center of Excellence in Maritime and Port Security in conjunction with SDMI is working to develop scenarios and tabletop exercise resources to enhance the core capabilities and preparedness of port facilities and port operators to an array of hazards, including natural and man-made threats. It is our intent to extend these resources to the broad spectrum of port partners that comprise the maritime community, including public and private, local, state and Federal organizations. The MSC/SDMI tabletop exercise program builds upon other nationally recognized Executive Education Programs to provide support and resource materials for maritime and port stakeholders to develop and exercise their own tabletop and discussion-based activities.

This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Cooperative Agreement No. 2014-ST-061-ML0001.
Program Objectives

- Identify and examine homeland security challenges in the maritime space and enhance preparedness, response and mitigation efforts through exercising core capabilities.
- Discuss potential options to meet homeland security challenges in practical and sustainable ways.
- Integrate lessons learned in the development and execution of this event to facilitate the creation of tools and resources for future discussion-based exercises.
- Identify recommendations for follow-on action by exercise participants.

Agenda Review

- Under the Agenda Tab in participants handouts

Event Format

- Interactive roundtable discussion.
- Video scenarios will be used to help frame issues.
- We want to explore unique emergency management challenges and issues at the federal, state and local level. Particularly we want to understand the coordination issues between responding agencies and avoid tactical details.
- It is OK to debate current policies and each other.
- Primary focus will be on intergovernmental and private sector challenges as well as some of the unique response and recovery elements in a catastrophic scenario.

Introductions

- Introduction of the Port of New Orleans Exercise Participants
- Introduction of Panel Members and Event Facilitator

9:10 a.m.
Event Objectives and Key Questions
Stan McKinney, Event Facilitator

Port of New Orleans Primary Objectives:

Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing

Objective 1: Validate how the Port Enterprise System conducts intelligence and information sharing once an increase in security posture has been recommended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) due to an increased likelihood of a pending terrorist attack on an unknown target.
Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Objective 2: Examine the operational coordination requirements between federal, state and local first responder agencies in response to a terrorist attack on a land based port facility.

Core Capability: Economic Recovery

Objective 3: Identify potential fallout from a terrorist attack on a port facility and the sequence of actions to mitigate impacts and ensure the port is able to fully recover economically.

Port of New Orleans Secondary Objectives:

Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing

- Identify strengths, gaps and needs in the intelligence and information sharing environment in the Port of New Orleans.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

- Enhance the ability of the Port of New Orleans leaders and decision makers to respond to a major emergency or disaster.
- Identify ways to improve safety and security of port facilities and operations during emergency events.
- Examine the limitations of mutual aid, with the intent to determine the capabilities of the Port of New Orleans to respond to an event absent of substantial and immediate assistance.
- Develop a common understanding of key homeland security policies, emergency management strategies, authorities, plans and organizational structure.
- Identify areas of improvement for the emergency management program.
- Identify gaps and needs in the command and control structure of disaster response. Examine the ways to minimize consequences and impacts of an attack on the Port of New Orleans.

Core Capability: Economic Recovery

- Examine the threats and impacts of an asymmetric attack to the Port of New Orleans.

Key Questions

The overarching exercise questions.

- What are the unique challenges to responding to an active shooter at the Port of New Orleans?
- How does threat information get disseminated to the Port enterprise system?
Who is the agency/person responsible for the overall coordination and response to an ongoing active shooter event?

How is the strategic planning process undertaken in the Port of New Orleans? How are homeland security and emergency management integrated into this process?

What authorities and plans are in place to support effective preparedness, prevention, response and recovery?

What is the role of the senior leadership in protecting port operations and setting the stage for expedient and efficient recovery? Does the current organizational structure effectively support that process?

How informed and engaged are governmental leaders and personnel in prevention and preparedness? The private sector?

What is the process to comprehensively identify and prioritize the risks to homeland security in the Port of New Orleans, through examining vulnerabilities, consequences and threats?

How do we understand the executive level decision-making process as it pertains to prevention, preparedness for, and response and recovery to a catastrophe – natural, accidental or human caused – in the Port of New Orleans?

What do we understand to be the strengths and limitations of external support to the Port of New Orleans in the event of a catastrophe?

9:20 a.m.
Opening Conversation

What are the priority risks and threats as perceived by the Port of New Orleans leadership? What are the major consequences of an Active Shooter event that keeps you up at night?

9:30 a.m.
Core Capability Focus Area: Intelligence Fusion and Information Sharing

VIDEO INJECT 1- PORT OF NEW ORLEANS VIDEO ONE – INTEL BULLETIN

Components of Information Sharing and Fusion Collaboration and how they work.

General overview:

- From a regional perspective, how does the intelligence process work – federal, state, and local flow of information? Is there too much reliance on the federal government to take the lead on Intelligence?
- Describe the Intelligence Fusion system in Louisiana and the City of New Orleans to include the Port of New Orleans.
- What process is used to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and info products? What is the status of intelligence and information fusion efforts? Is it meeting your expectations?
- Should all disciplines be involved? How are public health and other agencies incorporated into the intelligence collection, analysis/fusion, dissemination and feedback process? Are there any policy or operational considerations?
- How should regional entities be involved in intelligence sharing/collaboration?
- What role does/should the private sector play in intelligence strategies? Are private sector entities within the port system getting access to information? How is it disseminated?
- Are there any issues regarding legal authorities/statutory limitations to gather intelligence and share it with law enforcement – e.g. open meeting/disclosure laws, etc.?
- Do you expect information and intelligence to be shared regionally?
- Who should drive or determine the end products of the fusion process? What do elected officials expect as end products for their consumption?

Threat:

Next we will examine the general theories and realities concerning threats, concluding with a threat overview for this exercise.

Threat Discussion – Port of New Orleans Specific
- What are the greatest threats to the local port community?
- How should responsibilities be set for threat identification - federal, state, or local governments? The cruise line industry? Who should be involved and/or excluded and why? Which agencies are responsible now?
- How is the federal government organized to identify threat? Is it meeting expectations?
- What are the policy challenges associated with threat identification? Can or should they be addressed?

9:50 a.m.
Current Threat Overview Brief
Steve Sin, Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START)
University of Maryland
10:00 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination
Authorities and Capacities

VIDEO INJECT 2 - PORT OF NEW ORLEANS VIDEO TWO – BREAKING NEWS

The Structure of Disaster Response in the Port of New Orleans: ICS, NIMS and Unified Command

This aspect of the exercise will focus upon creating a baseline understanding of the system of incident management and coordination in the Port of New Orleans. Focal points will include the Incident Command System (ICS) and its relationship to Unified Command and Policy – Level Decision Making

Key Questions: Authorities and Capacities

- How would a major and catastrophic incident in the Port of New Orleans be managed and coordinated?
- What are the authorities who can force closure of facilities? To what extent do closures take place?
- What considerations are given to closure of the river? If closed, for how long?
- How will state and federal law enforcement resources be requested and how will they be engaged in a major active shooter event?
- Has sufficient training been provided and required to ensure employees with disaster responsibilities are equipped to undertake assigned duties? Has coordinated training between federal, state and local law enforcement taken place for a major terrorist event? Have security personnel from the cruise lines been integrated into training?
- What law enforcement resources are available to assist in the response? What are realistic response times before those resources could arrive at the scene?
- Are adequate logistics management plans and systems in place to support catastrophic disaster requirements?
- How will interoperable communications be achieved between various response organizations and agencies? Are the cruise lines included in some fashion? Are current systems survivable?
- What are the expected roles of various agencies in preparedness? How is this communicated within the port community? What is the expected role of the cruise lines in preparedness?
- Is the process and system of emergency coordination at the policy level well understood? What needs to be done to ensure a common understanding of roles and responsibilities during a crisis?
10:15 a.m.
Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination
Incident and Unified Command

At this point in the scenario, the Subject Matter Panel will lead and participate in an examination of the principles and implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS), with specific focus given to multi-jurisdictional operations and Unified Command

Key Questions: Incident Management and ICS

The panel will focus upon a priority topic: The use of Incident Command as an organizing principle for all phases of response to a disaster.

- How would the Port of New Orleans assess and summarize the status of familiarity and use of the Incident Command System to organize response to a disaster? What are the gaps and needs in implementation and use of ICS?
- Are the basic priorities of ICS – Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation – integrated into the planning, logistics, operations and administrative functions of ICS response?
- Has ICS been used to coordinate multi-jurisdictional response and management of a disaster in the Port of New Orleans?
- Is there understanding and experience in the implementation of Unified Command both internal to the port departments and disciplines, and mutual aid assets?
- In particular, what is the experience of the Port of New Orleans and mutual aid jurisdictions in implementing Unified Command to address the three ICS priorities of Life Safety, Incident Stabilization and Property Conservation?
- What needs to be done to further improve the understanding and implementation of ICS and Unified Command in the Port of New Orleans?
- What is the status of National Incident Management System (NIMS) certification level training in the Port of New Orleans? Is it accepted as a workable and necessary system?

10:30 a.m. Break
10:45 a.m.
Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination
Asymmetric Attacks

Examination of the Principles of “Asymmetric Warfare”

Opening Discussion – The basic theory is that asymmetric attacks, as distinguished from “linear warfare” are characterized by a weaker adversary enlisting surprise, unpredictability and the exploitation of vulnerabilities against “stronger” adversaries. Simply put, the objective of an asymmetric attack is to require the defending force to expend its resources to the point of being disabled, and out of all proportion to the resource expenditure of the attacking force.

Key Questions and Issues Concerning Response to Asymmetric Attacks:

- The process of identifying infrastructure and system vulnerabilities underpins the planning process to address asymmetric attacks. In a real sense, the same methodologies as those used in the Risk Assessment process are applicable in this specialized strategic and tactical arena. The additional process of attempting to identify which targets are proximate to one another, accessible by foot or other transportation medium, which have additional attractive components (population density, multiple targets in one attack, etc) is part of the analytical process.

- The ability of the intelligence fusion system to quickly analyze and share situational awareness of unfolding asymmetric attacks is key to both response and stabilization of the disaster. The intelligence fusion system should be assessed for its capacity to support the command and control efforts in the context of an asymmetric attack or series of attacks.

- It is problematic to over-rely upon the ICS structure in the initial response to asymmetric attacks. The most applicable model for response is the “active shooter” model, which –ideally – is supported by special operations, namely counter snipers, bomb squad and emergency medical support properly protected by SWAT or other special ops assets.

11:00 a.m.
Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination
Internal, External

Internal, External Communications and Media Considerations:

- What requests should officials anticipate from the media?
- How should the media be engaged to reduce uneasiness/fear?
- How should preparedness and prevention information be communicated to the public?
- How do we “talk” about our vulnerabilities to the public?
- How do you expect to deal with special populations (cultural/language/ethnic, schools, elderly and homebound citizens)?
What would be the public’s expectation for information and guidance before, during and after an incident?
How can you resolve the risk of the media reporting sensitive security information related to potential terrorist targets?
What information should be released to the public? Who decides? What type of discussion occurs when deciding what to say and who will say it?
How will the media react? What public information strategies should officials employ?
At what point should federal, state and local governments engage in pointed and assertive public communications regarding the potential consequences/impacts of an impending disaster? How should the message be coordinated?
At what point should federal, state and local governments confirm to the public that an event is terrorist in nature? How should this message be coordinated?
A complex multi-jurisdictional crisis creates a risk of multiple, conflicting presentation of vital information both internally and externally. What is the structure of Joint Information? How is it triggered? Who’s in charge?
What is the role of Joint Information Systems/Centers (JIS/JIC) and how should federal, state, county/urban area JICs be coordinated? Should the cruise lines be incorporated into the JIC?
Who would be the spokesperson(s) for response operations?
What would be the public’s expectations for information and guidance? Before, during and after?
Should your strategy for public communications consider enlisting the public’s support in both preparing for and responding to a disaster incident?
Where would the public go for their information? Are there many hubs of information and how are they linked to ensure consistent messaging?
How is social media utilized in the Port of New Orleans?

11:20 a.m.
Core Capability Focus Area: Economic Recovery
Recovery and Resiliency

VIDEO INJECT 3 - PORT OF NEW ORLEANS VIDEO THREE – LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES

This section of the exercise will build upon the earlier discussions on Intelligence Sharing and Operational Coordination to include Recovery and Resiliency.
Recovery and Resiliency
Resilience is a relatively new concept in DHS’ official lexicon and is used more frequently in national policy guidance and strategies. Among the Port of New Orleans participants, is resilience a new concept and what does it mean for you?

- The National Preparedness Goal proposes that we prepare along five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Is this approach consistent with your jurisdiction’s efforts? Why or why not?
- What type of strategic direction do these ideas provide to you, and how do they overlap with resilience?
- What do officials expect to have in place in order to accomplish all of these elements? Is this “idealistic” or “realistic?”
- What policies, structures and/or resources are necessary to accomplish this type of systematic approach?
- Is it realistic to expect your jurisdiction to accomplish all of these elements alone? How can they be resourced?
- What is the process for moving from response to recovery and standing down deployed measures?
- What are the unique concerns in the recovery phase for a catastrophic event?
- What are the implications on the cruise industry for the Port of New Orleans and the industry as a whole?
- What type of impact does this have on the embarkation and disembarkation process of the cruise industry? What changes would federal agencies make to their current processes?
- Does the Coast Guard change the security posture of its MARSEC level? Does this extent to other Ports? If elevated, how long is a reasonable duration for an increased security posture?

11:45 a.m.
Summary

At this point, the discussion will revisit the key question, What are the major consequences of an Active Shooter event that keeps you up at night? Do critical areas need further conversation?

This begins a comprehensive examination of the key points discerned during the seminar, with a view towards identifying next steps.

Summary Discussion and Next Steps
- The summary of today’s discussion will be a collective effort.
- Three questions to consider:
Maritime Security Center

8 June 2016

- What were the most significant issues and/or points of discussion from this exercise?
- Was there anything you wanted to say, but didn’t have an opportunity or that was not covered in the discussion?
- What should be the top priorities for future efforts in the Port of New Orleans? Immediate? Next several months? Years?
  - How has your understanding of key homeland security policies and emergency management strategies changed?
  - How will your leadership review authorities, plans and organizational structure in coming months or years? What outcomes would you like to see?
  - Which areas of the emergency management program could be improved in the future?
  - Has the placement of catastrophic disaster planning in your list of priorities changed at all based on today’s discussion?
  - Subject Matter Panel closing comments

Closing Comments
- Stephenson Disaster Management Institute (Brant Mitchell)
- The Port of New Orleans Leadership

12:00 p.m.

Adjournment