This talk will examine the effect of technological uncertainty on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in a two-sided market. A platform offers a basic good and a developer offers a complementary good. The performance of the complementary good is stochastic and is determined by the pricing policy the platform adopts. A platform's pricing policy depends on the value of the complementary good and the cost of its development. If the cost is small, a price skimming policy is optimal. When the cost is higher, price skimming remains optimal if the value of the complementary good is either small or relatively high. For intermediate values, the platform adopts a price penetration policy.
Presenter: Prof. Alexander Rodivilov
Dr. Rodivilov joined Stevens after completing his Ph.D. in economics at the University of Washington. In his research, he focuses on the role incentive problems play in structuring optimal contracts and mechanisms. His doctoral dissertation, which investigates optimal contracts for R&D projects, won the 2017 Grover and Greta Ensley Fellowship.