Game theoretic approaches for designing and protecting infrastructure systems against intentional attacks
BY: Dr. Chi Zhang '12
Assistant Professor - Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua University
ABSTRACT: It is now paramount to protect critical infrastructures because of their significance to the economic development and the social well-being of modern societies. One of the main threats to these systems is from intentional attackers, who are known to be intelligent. To deal with the strategy interaction between the protector and attacker, game theoretic approaches have been widely utilized. One of the most important issues encountered when implementing this type of approaches is the policy of disclosing the information regarding protection strategies. Two information disclosure policies will be discussed in this talk: truthful disclosure and secrecy. While the former is modeled as a two-stage game, the latter is modeled as a simultaneous game between a protector and an attacker. Due to the complexity of critical infrastructures, there are usually a large number of combinations of potential protection and attack strategies, leading to a computational challenge in solving the proposed games. Therefore, new approaches are developed to identify the equilibrium solutions of the described games. Besides protecting existing infrastructure systems, the problem of designing systems (i.e., the facility location problem) while considering the potential intentional attacks is also studied.
BIOGRAPHY: Dr. Chi Zhang is an assistant professor in the Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua University. He received his Ph.D. degree in Systems Engineering from Stevens Institute of Technology in May, 2012, and his B.S. degree in Industrial Engineering and M.S. degree in Management Science & Engineering, both from Xi'an Jiaotong University. His research has been published in peer reviewed journals such as IIE Transactions, European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, among others. His current research is focused on networked systems reliability analysis and optimization, maintenance optimization, critical infrastructure protection, and warranty policy.