Gröbner Bases of Structured Systems and their Applications in Cryptology

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Algebraic Cryptanalysis



Crypto primitive





$Algebraic\ Cryptanalysis$



$Algebraic\ Cryptanalysis$



$Algebraic \ Cryptanalysis$



Issues

- Which algebraic modeling ?
- Tradeoff between the degree of the equations/number of variables ?
- Solving tools: Gröbner bases ? SAT-solvers ? ...
- **Structure** ?

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Impact on the solving process ? Complexity ? Dedicated algorithms ?

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Families of structured algebraic systems

${\it Multi-homogeneous\ systems}$

- McEliece PKC.
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- Cryptosystems based on rank metric codes.
- Hidden Field Equations and variants.
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Systems invariant by symmetries

Discrete log on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves.

1 Polynomial System Solving using Gröbner Bases

2 Bilinear Systems and Application to McEliece

3 Determinantal Systems and Applications to MinRank and HFE

Gröbner bases (I)

Gr"obner bases

 \mathcal{I} a **polynomial ideal**. Gröbner basis (w.r.t. a monomial ordering): $G \subset \mathcal{I}$ a finite set of polynomials such that $LM(\mathcal{I}) = \langle LM(G) \rangle$.

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Polynomial system	$\xrightarrow{F_4/F_5}$	grevlex GB	FGL M	lex GB.	

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XL/MXL

Most of the **complexity results** also valid for **XL/MXL** Buchman/Bulygin/Cabarcas/Ding/Mohamed/Mohamed PQCrypto 2008, Africacrypt 2010,... Ars/Faugère/Imai/Kawazoe/Sugita, Asiacrypt 2004 Albrecht/Cid/Faugère/Perret, eprint

Gröbner bases (II)

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Lexicographical Gröbner basis of 0-dimensional systems

Equivalent system in triangular shape:

$$f_{1}(x_{1},...,x_{n}) = 0$$

$$\vdots$$

$$f_{\ell}(x_{1},...,x_{n}) = 0$$

$$f_{\ell+1}(x_{2},...,x_{n}) = 0$$

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$$f_{m-1}(x_{n-1},x_{n}) = 0$$

$$f_{m}(x_{n}) = 0$$

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Macaulay matrix in degree d

 $\mathcal{I} = \langle f_1, \dots, f_p \rangle$ deg $(f_i) = d_i$ \succ a monomial ordering

Rows: all products tf_i where t is a monomial of degree at most $d - d_i$. **Columns**: monomials of degree at most d.

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
m_1 \succ \cdots \succ m_\ell \\
t_1 f_1 \\
\vdots \\
t_k f_p \end{array} \left(\begin{array}{c} & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \end{array} \right)$$

row echelon form of the Macaulay matrix with d sufficiently high

 \implies Gröbner basis.

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Problems ■ Degree falls. ■ Rank defect ~> useless computations. ~> Hilbert series: generating series of the rank defects of the Macaulay matrices. ■ Which d ? ~> degree of regularity. 28

Two main indicators of the complexity

- Degree of regularity d_{reg} → degree that has to be reached to compute the grevlex GB.
- **Degree of the ideal** $\mathcal{I} = \langle f_1, \dots f_m \rangle$

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Algorithms	grevlex GB	Change of Ordering
Complexity	$O\left(\binom{n+d_{reg}}{d_{reg}}\right)^{\omega}$	$O\left(n\cdot\#Sol^\omega ight)$

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Classical bounds (sharp for generic systems)

Let $f_1, \ldots, f_n \in \mathbb{K}[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$ be a "generic" system.

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$$d_{reg} \leq 1 + \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} (d_i - 1)$$
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Bézout bound:
$$deg(\langle f_1, \ldots, f_n \rangle) \leq \prod_{1 \leq i \leq n} d_i$$
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Are there sharper bounds for structured systems ?

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$Multi-homogeneous\ polynomial$

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$$f(\lambda_1\underline{X}^{(1)},\ldots,\lambda_\ell\underline{X}^{(\ell)})=\lambda_1^{d_1}\ldots\lambda_\ell^{d_\ell}f(\underline{X}^{(1)},\ldots,\underline{X}^{(\ell)}).$$

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Example:

 $3x_1^2y_1 + 4x_1x_2y_1 - 3x_2^2y_1 - x_1^2y_2 + 8x_1x_2y_2 - 5x_2^2y_2 + 10x_1^2y_3 - 2x_1x_2y_3 - 3x_2^2y_3$ is a *bi-homogeneous polynomial* of bi-degree (2, 1) in $\mathbb{F}_{11}[x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, y_3]$.

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Bilinear system: multi-homogeneous of multi-degree (1,1)

 $f_1, \dots, f_q \in \mathbb{K}[\underline{X}, \underline{Y}]: \text{ bilinear forms.}$ $f_k = \sum a_{i,j}^{(k)} x_i y_j.$

Structure of bilinear systems

Euler relations

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$$\mathsf{jac}_{x}(F) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial f_{1}}{\partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f_{1}}{\partial x_{n_{x}}} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial f_{q}}{\partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f_{q}}{\partial x_{n_{x}}} \end{pmatrix} \qquad \mathsf{jac}_{y}(F) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial f_{1}}{\partial y_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f_{1}}{\partial y_{n_{y}}} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial f_{q}}{\partial y_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f_{q}}{\partial y_{n_{y}}} \end{pmatrix}$$
$$\implies \begin{pmatrix} f_{1} \\ \vdots \\ f_{q} \end{pmatrix} = \mathsf{jac}_{x}(F) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_{1} \\ \vdots \\ x_{n_{x}} \end{pmatrix} = \mathsf{jac}_{y}(F) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} y_{1} \\ \vdots \\ y_{n_{y}} \end{pmatrix}.$$

Something special happens with minors...

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_q \end{pmatrix} = \mathsf{jac}_x(F) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_{n_x} \end{pmatrix}.$$

If $(x_1, \ldots, x_{n_x}, y_1, \ldots, y_{n_y})$ is a non-trivial solution of F, then $jac_x(F)$ is rank defective. $\rightsquigarrow (y_1, \ldots, y_{n_y})$ is a zero of the maximal minors of $jac_x(F)$.

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Bernstein/Sturmfels/Zelevinski, Adv. in Math. 1993

M a $p \times q$ matrix whose entries are variables. For any monomial ordering, the maximal minors of *M* are a Gröbner basis of the associated ideal.

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Faugère/Safey El Din/S., J. of Symb. Comp. 2011

M a *k*-variate $q \times p$ linear matrix (with q > p). Generically, a grevlex GB of (Minors(*M*)): linear combination of the generators.

$$\rightsquigarrow \mathsf{d}_{\mathsf{reg}}\left(\mathsf{MaxMinors}(\mathsf{jac}_{\mathsf{X}}(\mathsf{F}))\right) = \mathbf{n}_{\mathsf{X}}.$$
Affine bilinear polynomial

 $f \in \mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_{n_x}, y_1, \dots, y_{n_y}]$ is said to be affine bilinear if there exists a bilinear polynomial \tilde{f} in $\mathbb{K}[x_0, \dots, x_{n_x}, y_0, \dots, y_{n_y}]$ such that

$$f(x_1,\ldots,x_{n_x},y_1,\ldots,y_{n_y})=\tilde{f}(1,x_1,\ldots,x_{n_x},1,y_1,\ldots,y_{n_y}).$$

Faugère/Safey El Din/S., J. of Symb. Comp. 2011

$Degree \ of \ regularity$

Let $f_1, \ldots, f_{n_x+n_y}$ be an affine bilinear system in $\mathbb{K}[x_1, \ldots, x_{n_x}, y_1, \ldots, y_{n_y}]$. Then the highest degree reached during the computation of a Gröbner basis for the grevlex ordering is upper bounded by

 $\min(\mathbf{n}_{\mathbf{x}},\mathbf{n}_{\mathbf{y}})+1 \ll n_{\mathbf{x}}+n_{\mathbf{y}}+1.$

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Consequences

- The complexity of computing a grevlex GB is polynomial in the number of solutions !!
- Bilinear systems with unbalanced sizes of blocks of variables are easy to solve !!

Modeling of McEliece cryptosystem

Based on alternant codes:

secret key: a parity-check matrix of the form

$$H = \begin{pmatrix} y_0 & y_1 & \cdots & y_{n-1} \\ y_0 x_0 & y_1 x_1 & \cdots & y_{n-1} x_{n-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ y_0 x_0^{t-1} & y_1 x_1^{t-1} & \cdots & y_n x_n^{t-1} \end{pmatrix},$$

where $x_i, y_j \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$, with x_0, \ldots, x_n pairwise distinct and $y_j \neq 0$. **public key: a generator matrix** G of the same code.

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Problem

Given G, find H such that $H \cdot G^t = \mathbf{0}$!

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$$\rightsquigarrow \forall i, j, \quad g_{i,0} y_0 x_0^j + \cdots + g_{i,n-1} y_{n-1} x_{n-1}^j = 0.$$

 \Rightarrow Bi-homogeneous structure !!

Compact variants

Goal: reduce the size of the keys.

- **Quasi-cyclic** variant: Berger/Cayrel/Gaborit/Otmani Africacrypt'09;
- Dyadic variant: Misoczy/Barreto SAC'09.

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Faugère/Otmani/Perret/Tilich, Eurocrypt'2010

 \Rightarrow add **redundancy** to the polynomial system \rightsquigarrow linear equations \rightsquigarrow less variables.

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Moreover, the system is still over-determined and one can extract a subsystem containing only **powers of two**:

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\Rightarrow Bilinear system with $n_x \ll n_y$!!!

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Theoretical and Practical attacks on the quasi-cyclic and dyadic variants of McEliece !!

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The MinRank problem

 $r \in \mathbb{N}$. M_0, \ldots, M_k : k + 1 matrices of size $m \times m$.

MinRank

find $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_k$ such that

$$\operatorname{Rank}\left(M_0-\sum_{i=1}^k\lambda_i\,M_i\right)\leq r.$$

- Multivariate generalization of the Eigenvalue problem.
- Applications in cryptology, coding theory, ...
 Kipnis/Shamir Crypto'99, Courtois Asiacrypt'01
 Faugère/Levy-dit-Vehel/Perret Crypto'08,...
- Fundamental NP-hard problem of linear algebra.



Buss, Frandsen, Shallit.

The computational complexity of some problems of linear algebra.

$$\mathsf{M}=M_0-\sum_{i=1}^k\lambda_i\,M_i.$$

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- Complexity of solving MinRank using Gröbner bases techniques ?
- Comparison of the two modelings ?
- Number of solutions ?

	System	\longrightarrow	grevlex GB	\longrightarrow	lex GB.
Algorithms		grevlex GB	Chang	e of Orderin	g
Complexity	0	$\left(\binom{n+d_{reg}}{d_{reg}}\right)^{\infty}$) 0($n \cdot \# Sol^\omega)$	

	System	\longrightarrow	grevlex GB	\longrightarrow	lex GB.
Algorithms		grevlex GB	Cha	nge of Orde	ring
Complexity	0	$\left(\binom{n+d_{reg}}{d_{reg}}\right)^{\omega}$) ($\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{n} \cdot \# \mathbf{Sol}^{\omega})$)

Modeling:	Minors	Kipnis-Shamir		
Degree of regularity		Macaulay bound:		
when $k=(m-r)^2$		$\leq m(m-r)+1$		
# Sol	MH. Bézout: $\leq {\binom{m}{r}}^{m-r}$			
Complexity				

	System	\longrightarrow	grevlex GB	\longrightarrow	lex GB.
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Modeling:	Minors	Kipnis-Shamir
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Modeling:	Minors	Kipnis-Shamir
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Complexity		

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Degree of regularity when $k = (m - r)^2$	r(m-r)+1	$\leq (m-r)^2+1$
# Sol	$\prod_{i=0}^{m-r-1} \frac{1}{(m-1)}$	$\frac{i!(m+i)!}{(m-i)!(m-r+i)!}$
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Both modelings \rightarrow polynomial complexity when $\mathbf{k} = (\mathbf{m} - \mathbf{r})^2$ is fixed.

New Crypto challenge broken: 10 generic matrices of size 11×11 target rank 8, $\mathbb{K} = GF(65521)$. Courtois, Asiacrypt 2001.

Minors modeling:

$$\mathsf{Rank}(\mathsf{M}) \leq r$$
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→ Determinantal ideal

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 $Bilinear \ systems \leftrightarrow \ determinantal \ systems$

 $f_1, \ldots, f_q \in \mathbb{K}[\underline{X}, \underline{Y}]$: bilinear forms.

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1}{\partial x_0} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f_1}{\partial x_{n_x}} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial f_q}{\partial x_0} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f_q}{\partial x_{n_x}} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_0 \\ \vdots \\ x_{n_x} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_q \end{pmatrix}$$

 $f_1 = \ldots = f_q = 0 \iff \mathsf{MaxMinors}(\mathsf{Jac}_X(f_1, \ldots, f_q)) = 0.$

PJ Spaenlehauer

What is known

- Determinantal ideals: Bernstein/Zelevinsky J. of Alg. Comb. 93, Bruns/Conca 98, Sturmfels/Zelevinsky Adv. Math. 98, Conca/Herzog AMS'94, Lascoux 78, Abhyankar 88...
- Geometry of determinantal varieties: Room 39, Fulton Duke Math. J. 91, Giusti/Merle Int. Conf. on Alg. Geo. 82...
- Polar varieties: Bank/Giusti/Heintz/Safey/Schost
 AAECC'10,Bank/Giusti/Heintz/Pardo J. of Compl. 05, Safey/Schost ISSAC'03, Teissier Pure and Appl. Math. 91...

$$\mathcal{D} = \operatorname{Minors}_{r+1} \begin{pmatrix} v_{1,1} & \cdots & v_{1,m} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ v_{m,1} & \cdots & v_{m,m} \end{pmatrix}$$
Thom, Porteous, Giambelli, Harris-Tu, ...
The degree of \mathcal{D} is
$$\prod_{i=0}^{m-r-1} \frac{i!(m+i)!}{(m-1-i)!(m-r+i)!}$$
Conca/Herzog, Abhyankar
The Hilbert series of \mathcal{D} is
$$\operatorname{HS}_{\mathcal{D}}(t) = \frac{\det(A(t))}{t^{\binom{r}{2}}(1-t)^{(2m-r)r}}.$$

$$A_{i,j}(t) = \sum_{\ell} {m-i \choose \ell} {m-j \choose \ell} t^{\ell}.$$



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$$\operatorname{ISSAC'2010}_{\text{The degree of } \mathcal{I} \text{ is}}$$

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Complexity of the minors formulation (ISSAC'2010)

Degree of regularity for a 0-dim ideal = 1 + degree of the **Hilbert series**.

Corollary

The degree of regularity of \mathcal{I} is generically equal to

$$\mathbf{d}_{\mathsf{reg}} = r(m-r) + 1.$$

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Number of matrices and rank defect fixed. 0-dimensional case.

Corollary: asymptotic complexity

When $k = (m - r)^2$ is fixed, then the **complexity** of the **Gröbner basis** computation of the **minors** modeling is

 $O\left(m^{\omega k}\right)$.

Complexity of the Change of Ordering

Corollary: generic number of solutions

The number of solutions of a generic MinRank problem with $k = (m - r)^2$ is

$$#Sol = \prod_{i=0}^{m-r-1} \frac{i!(m+i)!}{(m-1-i)!(m-r+i)!} \\ \underset{m \to \infty}{\sim} m^k \prod_{i=0}^{m-r-1} \frac{i!}{(m-r+i)!}.$$

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Complexity of the Change of Ordering (ISSAC 2010)

The complexity of FGLM is upper bounded by $O(\#Sol^{\omega})$. If $k = (m - r)^2$, then

$$O\left(\#Sol^{\omega}\right) = O\left(m^{\omega k}\right)$$



Courtois. Asiacrypt'01.

Efficient zero-knowledge authentication based on a linear algebra problem MinRank.

 $\mathbb{K} = \mathsf{GF}(\mathbf{65521})$ (m,k,r): k matrices of size $m \times m$. Target rank: r.

Challenge	А	В			С		
	(6,9,3)	(7,9,4)	(8,9,5)	(9,9,6)	(11,9,8)		
degree	980	4116	14112	41580	259545		
	Minors modeling						
d _{reg}	10	13	16	19			
F₅ time	1.1s	28.4s	544s	9048s	-		
F₅ mem	488 MB	587 MB	1213 MB	5048 MB	-		
log ₂ (Nb op.)	21.5	25.9	29.2	32.7			
FGLM time	0.5s	28.5s	1033s	22171s	-		
	Kipnis-Shamir modeling						
dreg	5	6	7				
F₅ time	30s	3795s	328233s	∞			
F₅ mem	407 MB	3113 MB	58587 MB				
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Computational bottleneck: computing the minors. Computing effort needed for solving Challenge C: 238 days on 64 quadricore processors.
Algebraic cryptanalysis of (multi-)HFE

Patarin, Eurocrypt'96 Billet/Patarin/Seurin, ICSCC'08 Ding/Schmitt/Werner, Information Security, 2008

$$P(x) = \sum_{0 \leq i,j \leq r} p_{i,j} x^{q^i + q^j} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}, \text{ with } r \ll n$$

 \rightsquigarrow low-rank quadratic form $(\mathbb{F}_q)^n \rightarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^n$

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 \Rightarrow the secret polynomial can be recovered by solving a MinRank problem.

Bettale/Faugère/Perret, PKC 2011

The complexity of solving this MinRank problem is upper bounded by

$$O\left(n^{(r+1)\omega}\right)$$

- \rightsquigarrow algebraic attack with **polynomial complexity** in *n* !!
- → attacks on **odd-characteristic** variants;
- \rightsquigarrow generalizations to **multi-HFE**.

Structures have an impact on the complexity of the solving process in algebraic cryptanalysis !

Design, key size reduction, $\overset{\text{Structure}}{\longleftrightarrow}$ potential algebraic attacks.

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Other possible applications in Crypto of structured systems

Rank metric codes (Gabidulin/Ourivski/Honary/Ammar IEEE IT, 2003).

■ classical McEliece PKC (*McEliece 1978*).

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Algorithmic problems

■ Dedicated F₅ algorithm for multi-homogeneous systems.
~~> (Faugère, Safey, S., J. of Symb. Comp. 2011)

Dedicated algorithm for determinantal systems ?